Media Bans Between India And Pakistan
Detailed SUMMARY of the article “Access denied” by Khurram Abbas, Published in Dawn on September 18th, 2025:
The article analyzes the reciprocal *media bans* between *India* and *Pakistan* following the *Pahalgam terror attack* in *May 2025*. A week after the attack, *India* banned *16 mainstream Pakistani channels* including *Dawn News*, *Samaa TV*, *ARY News*, and *Geo News*, along with hundreds of *Pakistani X handles*, dozens of *YouTube channels*, and newspapers. In response, *Pakistan* banned *16 Indian YouTube news channels*, *31 YouTube links*, and *32 Indian news websites*. Despite the cessation of armed hostilities in the same month, users on both sides continue to be denied access to over *100 Pakistani and Indian media outlets*. The writer identifies five key factors driving these bans: First, both countries are experiencing a *decline in democratic norms*, with the *2025 V-Dem report* categorizing *Pakistan* as rapidly turning into an *autocratizing country* and *India* as an *’electoral autocracy’* with its worst democratic score since *1947*. Autocratic regimes tend to discourage critical information and ideas, leading to tighter control over media access. Second, both states are *fundamentally insecure* about differing ideas, with competing narratives of victory in the *May 2025 crisis* exacerbating these insecurities. Both *New Delhi* and *Islamabad* presented claims of decisive triumph to their citizens, leaving little room for dissenting voices. Third, existing *Pakistan-India hostilities* and the absence of *backchannel diplomacy* prolong the media bans, as neither side wants to appear weak by undoing decisions. Fourth, both governments fear negative reactions from *ultra-nationalist segments* of their societies, who might perceive restoration of media access as *’backstabbing’* rather than a goodwill gesture. Fifth, the media restrictions are part of a broader trend of *’fading bilateralism’* between the two countries, following denial of business access, citizen visits, and withdrawal from bilateral sporting ties. The bans have significant sociopolitical impacts: they enable manufactured perceptions on both sides while squeezing appetite for peace and dialogue. The media, which previously played constructive roles through initiatives like *Aman ki Asha* (launched by major media groups from both countries), now adopts partisan approaches, amplifying state narratives instead of promoting peace. *YouTube channels*, *24/7 media coverage*, and *social media campaigns* now portray restraint as *’betrayal’* and frame adversaries as weak, pushing up the political cost of normalization. The writer concludes that allowing cross-border media access carries greater benefits than costs and represents a *’low-hanging fruit’* that could be easily addressed through backchannel diplomacy.
# *Easy/Short SUMMARY*:
Following the *Pahalgam attack* in *May 2025*, *India* banned *16 Pakistani channels* and hundreds of social media handles, while *Pakistan* retaliated by blocking *16 Indian YouTube channels* and *32 news websites*. Over *100 media outlets* remain blocked on both sides. The bans reflect declining democratic norms, with *V-Dem 2025 report* ranking *Pakistan* as rapidly *autocratizing* and *India* as an *’electoral autocracy’* with its worst score since *1947*. Media restrictions amplify nationalist narratives, squeeze peace appetite, and represent *’fading bilateralism’* between the neighbors.
SOLUTIONS of The Problem*:
1. Restore Media Access*
Immediately unblock cross-border media channels and websites as a confidence-building measure through backchannel diplomacy.
*2. Establish Media Protocols*
Create bilateral agreements on media coverage during crises to prevent blanket bans and maintain information flow.
3. Revive Peace Initiatives*
Restart programs like *Aman ki Asha* to promote media cooperation and people-to-people exchanges.
4. Track-II Diplomacy*
Engage media professionals, journalists, and civil society in informal diplomatic channels for conflict resolution.
5. Democratic Reforms*
Address declining democratic norms in both countries through institutional strengthening and press freedom protection.
6. Counter Nationalism*
Launch campaigns to counter ultra-nationalist voices and promote moderate, peaceful narratives in both societies.
7. Economic Incentives*
Use trade and business opportunities to create stakeholders invested in bilateral media cooperation and access.
8. International Mediation*
Involve neutral third parties like *UN*, *EU*, or regional organizations to facilitate media access restoration.
9. Social Media Frameworks*
Develop joint mechanisms for regulating cross-border social media content without blanket censorship.
10. Gradual Normalization*
Start with limited media access restoration and gradually expand based on positive outcomes and reduced tensions.
# *IMPORTANT Facts and Figures Given in the article*:
– *India* banned *16 mainstream Pakistani channels* and hundreds of *Pakistani X handles* after *Pahalgam attack*.
– *Pakistan* retaliated by banning *16 Indian YouTube channels*, *31 YouTube links*, and *32 Indian news websites*.
– Over *100 Pakistani and Indian media outlets* remain blocked on both sides.
– *2025 V-Dem report* categorizes *Pakistan* as rapidly *autocratizing* and *India* as *’electoral autocracy’*.
– *India* has its worst democratic score since *1947* according to *V-Dem 2025*.
# *IMPORTANT Facts and Figures out of the article*:
– India banned channels including *Dawn News*, *Samaa TV*, *ARY News*, *Geo News*, and cricketers *Shoaib Akhtar* and *Basit Ali*’s channels.
– The bans were implemented on recommendations from India’s *Ministry of Home Affairs* citing national security concerns.
– India also ordered immediate ban on Pakistani content across all *OTT platforms* and digital streaming services.
– The *Pahalgam attack* led to complete rupture of *India-Pakistan diplomatic channels* including suspension of *Indus Waters Treaty*.
– *V-Dem Institute* tracks democracy in *179 countries* and ranks both India and Pakistan among declining democracies.
– Pakistan’s press freedom rank dropped to *150th* out of *180 countries* in *Reporters Without Borders 2024* index.
# *VOCABULARY*:
1. *Mainstream* (مرکزی دھارا) – Principal or dominant trend in opinion
2. *Selective* (منتخب) – Involving careful choice of particular things
3. *Hostilities* (دشمنیاں) – Acts of warfare or aggressive opposition
4. *Propaganda* (پروپیگنڈا) – Information used to promote political cause
5. *Autocratic* (خودمختار) – Ruling with absolute power
6. *Authoritarian* (آمرانہ) – Demanding strict obedience to authority
7. *Interventions* (مداخلت) – Actions of becoming involved in situation
8. *Watchdog* (نگراں ادارہ) – Organization monitoring others’ activities
9. *Autocratising* (آمریت پسند بننا) – Becoming more autocratic in nature
10. *Electoral* (انتخابی) – Relating to elections or voting
11. *Dissenting* (مخالف) – Holding or expressing different opinions
12. *Exacerbated* (بڑھایا) – Made problem or situation worse
13. *Backchannel* (پس پردہ) – Secret or unofficial communication method
14. *Ultra-nationalist* (انتہا پسند قوم پرست) – Extreme form of nationalism
15. *Backstabbing* (پیٹھ میں خنجر) – Betraying someone’s trust
16. *Bilateralism* (دو طرفہ تعلقات) – Involving two parties or countries
17. *Sociopolitical* (سماجی سیاسی) – Combining social and political factors
18. *Manufactured* (بنائے گئے) – Artificially created or produced
19. *Partisan* (جانبدار) – Showing strong support for particular side
20. *Normalisation* (معمول بنانا) – Process of bringing to normal state*
A WEEK after the Pahalgam terror attack in May, India banned 16 mainstream Pakistani channels and imposed a selective ban on hundreds of Pakistani X handles. It also blocked dozens of Pakistani YouTube channels and newspapers. In response, Pakistan banned 16 Indian YouTube news channels, 31 YouTube links and 32 Indian news websites. While armed hostilities ceased the same month, users on both sides continue to be denied access to over 100 Pakistani and Indian media outlets.
What motivates India and Pakistan to continue blocking access to each other’s media outlets? Apparently, each government cites ‘false/anti-state propaganda’ as justification for blocking the media outlets of the other side. However, the underlying reasons seem to be far more complex. There are several factors that contribute to the initiation and prolonging of such actions by both states.
First, the two South Asian states are experiencing a decline in democratic norms. In fact, autocratic and authoritarian tendencies are replacing democratic norms on both sides. For Pakistan, this is not new; the country has witnessed several periods of direct and indirect military interventions. According to the 2025 annual report of democracy watchdog V-Dem, Pakistan is in the process of rapidly turning into an autocratising country. But the report also categorises India as an ‘electoral autocracy’, presently with its worst score since 1947. Unlike democracies, autocratic regimes tend to discourage critical information and ideas. The lower India and Pakistan descend the democratic ladder, the tighter their grip becomes on access to critical information.
Second, the two states seem to be fundamentally insecure when it comes to differing ideas. The competing narratives of victory in the May 2025 crisis exacerbated these insecurities. Both New Delhi and Islamabad presented claims of a decisive triumph to their respective citizens. This narrative-building and perception-management exercise leaves little room for dissenting voices or alternative perspectives that might challenge the state’s version of events.
Media on both sides is amplifying state narratives.
Third, existing Pakistan-India hostilities and the absence of backchannel diplomacy are prolonging the respective bans on media outlets. In a highly hostile environment, neither Islamabad nor New Delhi seems willing to undo their decisions, which could be perceived as a weakness.
Fourth, New Delhi and Islamabad might be concerned about negative reactions of the ultra-nationalist segments of their respective societies. Instead of looking upon any potential restoration of access to news websites and media channels as a goodwill gesture, these segments might be perceiving it as ‘backstabbing’. Hence, neither Islamabad nor New Delhi wants uninvited criticism from hyper-nationalist voices.
Lastly, cutting down access to critical ideas and information is part of a broader trend of the fading ‘bilateralism’ between India and Pakistan. After denying business communities access to each other’s markets, stopping citizens from visiting each other’s cities, and withdrawing from bilateral sporting ties, the media industry, including the journalist community, has fallen prey to this broader trend of ‘fading bilateralism’.
The ban on media channels and the blocking of Indian and Pakistani news outlets has a significant sociopolitical impact.
First, in the absence of counter-information and critical narratives, perceptions on both sides are being manufactured. Resultantly, the appetite for peace and dialogue in public as well as in policymaking circles is being squeezed.
Second, the media used to play a constructive role in calming India-Pakistan hostilities. For instance, the Aman ki Asha initiative, launched by two major media groups — one in Pakistan, the other in India — had promoted media cooperation and people-to-people exchanges. This trend is now absent, because with reciprocal access denial, the majority of media houses and social media channels have resorted to a partisan and reactionary approach in reporting the conflict. YouTube channels, 24/7 media coverage, including fiery TV debates, and social media campaigns now portray restraint as ‘betrayal’ and frame ‘adversaries’ as weak. Hence, instead of being a ‘voice of peace’, mainstream as well as social media outlets on both sides are amplifying state narratives. Resultantly, the political cost of initiating a normalisation process is being pushed up.
In this environment, it is unlikely that either government will move to unblock access to the other’s news websites, social media platforms or mainstream media channels. In fact, allowing cross-border access to media channels and news sites carries greater benefits than costs. This is a low-hanging fruit, easy to pluck through backchannel diplomacy.
The writer is an analyst of South Asian affairs. The views expressed are his own.
Published in Dawn, September 18th, 2025